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A  COMPETITIVE  EUROPEAN  AERONAUTICAL  INDUSTRY 
(Communication  from  the  Commission) 1 .-
Explanatory memorandum  and  summary 
1.  This  communication  Is  Intended  to start  a  general  open  discussion on  the 
cond It  Ions  In  whIch  the  European  aeronaut I ca 1  1  ndus try  can  be  sure  of 
smooth  development  In  a  market  which  Is  bound  to  become  more  and  more 
competitive. 
2.  In  Europe  and  worldwide  the  civil  aeronautical  Industry  Is  undergoing 
profound  change,  characterized  by  two  recent  phenomena: 
* 
* 
by  developing  an  entire  family  of  commercial  Jets  and  making  a 
significant  breakthrough  on  the  world  market,  Including  the  United 
States,  Europe  has  become  a  fully-fledged  clvl 1  aviation 
manufacturer; 
cuts  In  defence  budgets  are  gradually  shifting  the  aeronautical 
Industry's  centre  of  gravity  from  military  to  civil  construction, 
prompting  companies  to  compensate  for  the  fall  In ml litary orders  bY 
Increased activity on  the  civil markets. 
3.  The  matter  has  to  be  dIscussed,  because  the  emergence  of  a  European 
clvl I  aeronautical  Industry  Is  broadening  the  competition  and  thus 
reducing  the profit margins  of  the  maJor  constructors  by  subjecting  them 
to  fierce competition over  prices. 
In  these  conditions  the  European  Industry  Is  handicapped  by  Its  size; 
Europe's  good  technical  performance  does  not  automaticallY  guarantee 
efficient  economic  performance,  the  great  potential  of  econom1es  of 
scale  remaining  untapped.  The  question  of  size  Is  fundamental  In  an 
Industry  where  competitiveness  Is  determined  largely  by  ever-rising 
production  costs  and  the  scale of  production. 
The  American  aeronautical  Industry  has  always  been  able  to  rei)'  on  a 
home  market  with  a  large  capacity.  This  has  enabled  It  to  develop 
highly  Integrated  structures,  from  the  design  stage  through  to 
production  and  marketing. 
In  Europe,  on  the  other  hand,  even  though  It  Is  act lve  on  the  world 
market,  the  aeronautical  Industry  has  retained  a  production  structure 
strictly  bound  to  the  national  territory,  as  a  result  In  particular  of 
the  dual  character  of  production  plants  and  companies.  Hitherto  It  has 
been  chiefly  through  cooperation  that  European  companies  have  In certain 
cases  been  able  to  solve  the  critical  problem of  size. 2.-
4.  This  Is  a  good  time  to  discuss  the matter  since: 
*  the  economy  Is  doing  well,  which  makes  It  easter  to  apply  the 
measures  needed  to  Improve  competitiveness; 
*  the  completion  of  the  Internal  market  should  provide  a  legal  and 
Institutional  framework  better  suited  to  the  needs  of  the 
aeronautical  Industry. 
5.  Clearly,  If  the  Commission  Is  unable  to  take  the  place  of  lndustrlll 
managers  or  the  ~ember  States  It  should  adopt  a  horizontal  approach  to 
Industrial  policy  and  help  solve  companies·  problems  by  creating  Jn 
environment  I table  to  Improve  competitiveness  In  the  Industry. 
That  Is  why  the  Commission  Is  proposing  to  make  a  detailed  diagnosis, 
with  the  collaboration  of  the  ~ember  States  and  all  the  Industries 
concerned,  of  the  competItIveness  of  the  European  c I vI I  aeronaut I ca I 
Industry,  and  then  to  create  framework  condl t Ions  such  as  will  Improve 
the  sltuat ton. 
Th 1  s  rna tter  Is  on  the  agenda  for  the  Counc I I  meetIng  (Industry)  on 
21  September  1990. A COUPETITIVE  EUROPEAN  AERONAUTICAL  INDUSTRY 
The  aerospace  Industry  Is  a  perfect  example  of  a  field  with  a  maximum 
concentrat Jon  of  high-technology  products  In  a  wide,  var led  range  of 
applications.  For  this  reason  It  Is  rightly  regarded  as  being  of  strategic 
Importance  for  Industrial,  commercial  and  technological  reasons  despite  Its 
relatively  small  size  In  economic  terms  - accounting  for  3%  of  the  EEC's 
Industrial  production;  1%  of  Industrial  employment,  or  500  000  direct  jobs; 
whl  le enjoying  a  trade surplus of  almost  ECU  6  000  ml  11  ion  In  1987. 
That  this  position  of  the  European  aerospace  Industry  at  the  leading  edge  of 
technology  has  been  recognized  Is  shown  by  the  scope  of  Its  Industrial  R&D, 
which  easily  outweighs  Its  share  of  Industrial  production.  This  Is  clearly 
linked  to  the  fact  that  economic  growth  In  Industrialized  countries  Is  closely 
related  to  the  development  of  Industries  using  advanced  technologies  because  of 
their  high  added  value  content. 
More  than  the  other  parts  of  the  aerospace  Industry,  that  of  civil  aircraft 
manufacture  covered  by  this  analysis  Is  open  to  fierce  competition,  which  means 
that  It  must  quickly  achieve  a  high  level  of  Industrial  competitiveness. 
However,  every  country  stl I I  tends  to  regard  national  abl I lty  In  both  aerospace 
and  armaments  as  being  a  national  asset  which  the  country  must  control  since  It 
Is  an  Important  plank  In  Its  defence  and  Industrial  policies.  The  Increasing 
difficulty  that  industrial  states  are  having  In  acQuiring  the  lndustr1al, 
techn I  ca I  and  f I  nanc I  a 1  muse I  e  needed  to  I  aunch  new  aerospace  products  has 
gradually  restricted national  autonomy. 
The  long-term  vlabl llty of  Europe's aircraft  Industry  wl  I I  therefore depend  more 
and  more  on  the  ability  of  the  Member  States  and  their  aerospace  companies  to 
give  precedence  to  a  Community  rather  than  a  national  approach. 
Against  that  background,  this communication  must  be  seen  as  paving  the  way  for  a 
general,  open  exercise  In  thinking  about  the  prerequisites  for  the  harmonious 
development  of  the  European  aircraft  Industry  In  a  market  where  normal 
competitive  forces  apply. 1.  Situation and  outlook 
1.1 ·Importance of civil  aircraft manufacture  to the aerospace  Industry 
Clvl 1 aircraft  account  for  about  30%  of  total  world  aerospace  activity but, 
although  there  are  severe  cyclic  variations,  they  clock  up  substantially 
higher  growth  rates  than  the other  branches  of  aerospace. 
Military equipment  still  dominates  the  aerospace  Industry with  about  55%  of 
activity,  but  while  ml lltary spending  Is  closely  I Inked  with  GNP  In  current 
terms,  the  relative  size  of  the  ml  I ltary  aircraft  sector  within  the 
aerospace  Industry  Is  gradually shrinking. 
Lastly,  after  a  very  fast  Initial  build-up  for  the  moon  shots  the  space 
sector  has  since  fallen  behind  In  constant-value  terms.  It  makes  up  about 
15%  of  the  world  aerospace  Industry,  chiefly  owing  to  the  US  market  for 
military  space  hardware.  Commercial  applications  are  still  marginal  as  a 
fraction of  total  production. 
1.2  World  market  growth 
The  world  market  of civil  aircraft  Is  growing  vigorously.  Demand  collapsed 
after  the  1979  oil  crisis  but  since  1987  It  has  recovered  on  a  scale 
exceeding all  forecasts.  World  traffic has  tripled since  1975. 
The  range  of  forecasts  Is  In  general  fairly  wide,  but  It  Is  reasonable  to 
expect  that  air  traffic  will  double  by  the  year  2000.  Compared  with  a 
world  fleet  of  8  000  aircraft  In  1988,  the  projection  Is  for  12  000  by  the 
year  2000  or  In  other  words  about  7  000  new  aircraft,  allowing  for  those 
having  to be  withdrawn  from  service. 
The  trend  Is  due  to  largely structural  factors,  namely: 
the  need  to replace  a  fleet  that  has  now  grown  old: 
economic  and  commercial  growth,  particularly  In  the  Pacific  rim, 
which  Is creating new  markets; 
deregulation  of  air  transport,  which  spurs  the  emergence  of  new 
carriers,  and  a  drop  In  fares,  particularly  In  regional  air 
transport. 
overall,  average  aircraft  size  Is  on  the  Increase.  Airport  and  airspace 
congestion  Is  causing  the  airlines  partly  to  revamp  their  fleets  by  using 
aircraft  with  Increasingly  greater  capacity. It  Is  Important  to  bear  In  mind  that,  as  In  the  past,  the  growth  trend  In 
~!'.'!!  a•:!:t!c:-:  w!!!  :~:::  t.o;  su.t.jc.c~  ~v  vtHy  marKeo  cycliC  variations. 
These  are  substantial  In  volume  and  value  terms  for  an  Industry  of  this 
size  In  which  the  production  process  Is  particularly  cumbersome  and 
complex.  In  addition  to  the  high  development  costs  they  are  by  far  the 
chief obstacle  to entering  the  sector  and  surviving  In  It  and  presuppose  an 
abl I lty  to  adapt  that  Is  one  of  the  crucial  factors  In  Industrial 
competitiveness. 
1.3  The  situation  In  Europe 
Europe's  market  share  In  the  present  commercial  Jet  fleet  Is  almost  18%  by 
value  (1988  orders)  with  the  balance  supplied  by  the  Americans.  In  the 
remaining  areas  of  the  civil  aircraft  Industry  (regional  transport 
aircraft,  business  aircraft,  light  aircraft  and  civil  helicopters),  which 
account  for  about  20%  of  total  clvl 1  aircraft  turnover,  Europe  Is 
relatively wei  I  placed with: 
about  two-thirds of  the  world  market  for  commuter  aircraft; 
one  third  of  the  world  market  for  business  aircraft  and  I lght 
aircraft;  and 
almost  one  third of  the world  helicopter  market. 
It  should  be  noted  that,  above  all  In  the  '50s,  the  us  aircraft  Industry 
used  the  development  of  military  transport  aircraft  In  order  to  derive 
clvl I  versions  of  these.  It  Is  certain  that  this  placed  the  American 
Industry  In  an  advantageous  situation. 
2.  Factors  In  competitiveness 
In  the  ml  I ltary  sphere  technological  performance  takes  precedence  over  the 
other  aspects  of  competitiveness,  while  In  the  civil  field  other  factors 
are  Just  as  Important  to  full  competitiveness.  Penetration  of  the  civil 
market,  where  competition  Is  very  keen,  presupposes  not  only  the 
aval lab I I lty of  high-performance  technology  but  also  that  firms  are capable 
of  producing  at  competitive prices,  and  then  have  a  high  level  of  sales and 
marketing  capabl I lty.  This  appl les  as  much  to  airframes  as  to  engines  and 
equipment  which- accounting  for  50,  20  and  30%  respectively  of  an 
aircraft's sel I lng  price- determine overall  product  qual lty. 
Although  the  civil  aircraft  Industry  performs  well  In  technologl~al  and 
commercial  terms  It  Is  stl I I  weak  In  certain areas of  production. 
).-6.-
2.1  High-performance  technology  underpins  the  European  push 
European  clvl I  aircraft,  from  commuter  aircraft  to  long-haul  alrl lners,  are 
at  least  eQual- and  most  often  markedly  superior- In  technology  to  the 
other  aircraft on  sale on  the  world  market. 
This  Is  because: 
most  European  aircraft,  being  of  more  recent  design,  Incorporate  the 
latest  technologies; 
publ lc  support  of  research  and  development  has  been  preferred  to  any 
other  form  of  Intervention; 
this  margin  of  technological  superiority  Is  a  prereQuisite  for 
gaining  a  foothold  In  the market; 
advanced  technology  Is  necessary  to  meet  Increasingly  stringent 
environmental  reQuirements. 
It  Is  nonetheless  so  that  the  fragmentation  of  public  support  for  R&D.  In 
the  various  Member  States,  has  resulted  In  cost  overruns  arising  from  the 
many  cases of  duplicated effort. 
2.2  A European sales breakthrough  held  back  by  production capacity 
In  view  of  the  position  previously  occupied  by  the  United  States  and  the 
airlines'  reluctance  to  buy  from  suppliers  who  have  newly  entered  the 
market  the  breakthrough  by  Europe's  civil  aircraft  Industry  Is  a  major 
commercial  success.  On  the  other  hand  It  will  not  be  complete  unless 
reflected  In  sales  levels  similar  to  those  of  competitors  and  those  sales 
are  made  at  prices  which  are  entirely  cost-covering.  In  these  areas, 
however,  the  European  Industry suffers  from  a  twofold  handicap: 
despite  the  change  In  Its  scale of  production,  the  European  !lrcraft 
Industry  lacks  the  flexibility  enabling  It  to  respond  without  delay 
to a  sudden  upsurge  In  demand.  The  result  Is  that  cycl lc  peaks  first 
benefit  the American  Industry,  which  has  shown  great  flexlbll lty with 
regard  to delivery  times  In  response  to  very  sharp growth  In  demand; 
the  length  of  production  runs  achieved  by  the  US  Industry- In 
particular owing  to  the  very  high  degree of  commonal lty  between  civil 
and  military  transport  aircraft  programmes  - confer  the  benefit  of 
major  economies  of  scale  which  the  European  Industry  has  so  far  Act 
enjoyed  to  the  same  extent  (see  next  point). 7.-
2.3  European  competitiveness  In  manufacturing  restricted by  a  lack of economies 
of scale 
Economies  of  scale  are  a  decisive  factor  In  determining  manufacturers' 
abl I tty  to  compete.  There  are  three  main  sources of  economies  of  scale: 
**  The  first,  deriving  from  mass  production,  enables  not  only  the  very 
high  fixed  launch  costs  of  a  new  programme  to  be  spread  over  more 
aircraft  but  also  enables  advantage  to  be  taken  of  what  Is  known  as 
the  "learning  curve"  I.e.  know-how  deriving  from  experience.  These 
two  basic  factors  sharply  reduce  the  cost  of  making  an  aircraft  In  a 
given  Industrial  fact 1  tty. 
Thus  where  factor  costs are  eQual  the  production  of  1000  examples  of 
a  new  type  of  aircraft  yields  an  average  saving  of  15-20%  compared 
with  a  production  run  of  250.  A  production  run  of  500  aircraft  -
never  previously  achieved  In  Europe  - Is  now  within  the  grasp  of 
Airbus  Jndustrle. 
**  The  second  factor  arises  from  the  abl 1  lty  to  reduce  the  fixed 
development  costs  for  a  programme  by  us 1  ng  concepts  and  components 
from  an  existing programme,  so  extending  the  cost-reducing effects of 
the  learning  curve  over  the  common  components.  Hence  the  Importance 
of  developing  a  family  of  aircraft  and  derivatives  from  an  existing 
programme. 
The  "family"  approach  has  now  been  Introduced  Into  Europe  by  Airbus, 
but  Its effect  Is  less  marked  than  In  the  United  States. 
**  The  third factor  lies  In  making  optimum  use of  production  facilities. 
Although  the  number  of  aircraft  produced  Is  crucial  to  a  programme's 
breaking-even,  the  amount  of  time  over  which  production  Is  spread  -
and  thus  the  rate of  production- Is  eQually  Important. 
Flexlbl I tty  of  production  facl 1 ltles  Is  Just  as  Important  as  total 
production  capacity  and  will  therefore  have  a  decisive  role  to  play  In 
Europe's  ability  to  maintain  and  strengthen  Its  position  on  the  world 
market.  Too  stow  a  production  build-up  adversely  affects  orders,  because 
the  resultant  longer  delivery  periods  are  unacceptable  to  the  airlines, 
which  operate within  an  ever-shortening business  timescale. 
Production  capacity  wl  I I  be  determined  by  an  optimum  compromise  be~een: 
**the higher  cost  of  under-uti I lzlng  surplus  production  capacity; 8.-
**the  lost  opportunity  resulting  from  the  loss  of  customers  to  the 
competition when  production capacity,  Instead,  has  been  set  at  too  low  a 
level,  causing  del Ivery  periods  to  become  too  long;  and 
**social  and  labour  laws  In  Europe  which,  compared  to  the  situation  In  the 
US,  foster  a  relatively  conservative  approach  to  work  force  levels  In 
order  to  avoid  the  adv~r~~  erfect~  of  overmann:n;  :n  a  recass:cn. 
However,  In  view  of  the  current  rapid  growth  In  orders,  shortages  of 
Qual I fled  staff  could  stifle  the  development  of  production  capacity  In 
the  long  term. 
3.  A basis for  action at Community  level 
In  view  of  the  Importance  of  economies  of  scale,  the  structural  problem 
facing  the  European  aircraft  Industry  Is  chiefly  Its  size  and  degree  of 
Integration.  As  the  Industry  In  the  United  States  currently  has  a  large 
home  market,  It  gains  a  head  start  from  Its  very  high  degree of  Integration 
In  both  design  and  production,  and  from  Its  demand  level. 
The  turnover  of  the  biggest  us  aerospace  manufacturer,  for  example,  Is 
eQual  to  that  of  Europe's  12  leading  aerospace  companies  put  together;  the 
three  leading  European  prime  contractors  (British  Aerospace,  Aerospatlale 
and  MBB)  have  on  average  25%  of  the  turnover  of  their  US  competitors 
(Boeing,  McConnel  Douglas  and  Lockheed). 
so  far  It  has  been  ch lefl y  through  cooper at ion  that  the  European  Industry 
has  solved  this critical  problem  of  size.  Despite  some  remarkable  results, 
this  Is  not  an  approach  that  permits  Integrated  strategic  management  owing 
to  the  dispersal  of  decision-making  centres  among  the  government  agencies 
responsible  for  launching  new  programmes,  the manufacturers  responsible  for 
production  and  the  sales  teams. 
structural  problems  of  this  kind  will  become  Increasingly  acute  as 
competition  In  the civil  aircraft  Industry  grows  keener  owing  to: 
cuts  In  defence  budgets  which,  by  reducing  the  size  of  military 
programmes,  will  cause  the  civil  side  of  the  Industry  to  bear  the 
ful 1  weight  of  certain  Items  of  R&D  expenditure  previously covered  by 
the  authorities as  part  of  ml  lltary spending; 
the shrinking of  "protected markets"  which  wl  II  cause  European- but, 
chiefly,  US  - manufacturers  to  offset  the  fall  In  government  orders 
by  stepping  up  their  level  of  activity  on  civil  commercial  aircraft 
markets;  and 
..... 
the  emergence  of  new  competitors,  In  particular  In  the  eQuipment 
sector. 9.-
As  the  stakes  are  high  and  crucial  to  Europe's  Industrial  and 
technological  Independence,  cooperation  between  Community  companies,  In 
I lne  with  the  rules  of  competition,  could  prove  to  be  an  urgent  need  In 
certain  activity  areas.  Thus  world-scale  entitles  would  be  created 
which  were  then  capable  - If  necessary- of  forging  transatlantic 
cooperative  links  on  an  eQual  footing.  To  bring  this  about  the 
Community  must  set  up  the  right  framework  enabl tng  cooperation  between 
CommunIty  f I  rms  to  deve I  op·. 
4.  The  arrangements  for  completing  the  Internal  market  must  make  It  easler 
for  the European  aerospace  Industry  to  Integrate 
Since  the  aerospace  Industry  Is  In  essence  facing  world-wide 
competition,  the  completion  of  the  Internal  market  will  not  cause  any 
basic  change  In  the  structure  of  demand  for  large  commercial  transport 
aircraft.  However,  the  other  parts  of  the  Industry  with  chiefly 
domestic outlets,  must  adapt  to  competition  on  a  wider  front. 
Indeed,  the  Industry  must  try  to  take  advantage  of  the  spin-off  from  the 
Internal  market,  In  order  to  acQuire  efficient  Industrial  structures  on 
a  similar  level  to  those  of  Its  chief  competitors.  Apart  from  the 
conseQuences  of  active  R&D  and  tight  state-aid  policies,  the  aircraft 
Industry  wl  I I  be  In  a  position  to  benefit  from  the  action  taken  as  part 
of  work  to complete  the  Internal  market  In  the  following  fields: 
1.  Company  law  and  taxation; 
2.  Vetting of  mergers; 
3.  Standardization and  certification; 
4.  Export  credit  Insurance. 
5.  Trans-Europ~an networks. 
4.1  Company  law  and  taxation 
In  recent  years  several  Member  States  have  tried  to  bring  together 
complementary  entitles  and  have  devised  restructuring  arrangements  for 
the aircraft  Industry  on  a  purely  national  basis.  Whatever  the  outcome, 
the  Industry  Is  still  too  small  In  Industrial,  financial  and  often  In 
technological  terms  compared  with  the  US  Industry. 
Facing  as  It  does  the  highly  Integrated  structures  of  Its  competitors 
and  the  global  scope  of  the  market,  the  European  aircraft  Industry  lacks 
a  Community  legal  framework  that  Is  appropriate  to  transfrontler 
operatIons.  At  present  there  Is  only  the  European  Economic  Interest 
Grouping  (EEIG)  which  can  be  used  as  a  vehicle  for  certain~- still 
relatively  I lmlted- joint  activities. 10.-
The  proposal  for  a  regulation  on  the  Statute  for  a  European  Company  now 
before  the  Council  could  provide  the  legal  framework  for  matching  the 
structure  of  the  Industry  and  Its  business  management  to  the  scale  of 
the  market.  The  adoption  of  this  regulation  may  be  a  major  factor  In 
the  Integration  of  the  European  aerospace  Industry,  since  It  wl  11 
strengthen  the  legal  feaslbll lty of  that  exercise. 
In  terms  of  taxat lon  the  adopt lon  In  July  1990  by  the  Council  of  the 
package  of  three  directives  on  mergers,  parent  companies  and 
subsldlalres  and  on  the  removal  of  double  business  taxation  by  laying 
down  an  arbitration  procedure,  means  the  removal  of  barriers  to  cross-
frontier  cooperation  between  companies.  These  directives  wl  II  come  Into 
force  In  1992. 
4.2  Vetting of mergers 
The  assessment  criteria  set  out  In  the  regulation  on  the  vetting  of 
mergers  approved  by  the  Councl I  In  1989  wl  11  be  appl led  by  the 
Commission  to  Community-wide  operations.  In  this  connection  the 
Commission  will  take  account  of  the  specific  economic  and  Industrial 
features  of  the  aircraft  Industry,  beaurlng  In  mind  that  some  sectors 
within  the  Industry  are  characterized by: 
global  markets  where 
sustain  companies 
Internationally; 
domestic  markets  are  proving 
of  sufficient  strength 
too  small  to 
to  compete 
Industrial  operations  on  such  a  scale  that  no  existing  European 
company  can  master  al 1 the  technologies  and  the  production facilities 
needed  to  handle  a  complete  programme  In  Industrial  and  business 
terms; 
financing  requirements  which,  have  risen  to  a  level  at  which  no 
single actor  can  cover  all  Its needs  on  Its own; 
the  high  level  of  Integration  of  the  European  Industry's  chief 
competItors. 
In  this  situation- with  strong,  world-wide  competition- there  may  be 
Instances  In  which  the  formation  of  legal  entitles  combining  the 
Community's  supply  capacity  In  certain  areas  of  the  aircraft  Industry 
will  not  lead  to  the  creation  of  bolstering  of  a  dominant  position 
within  the  Community  market.  Where  this  Is  the  case,  such  developments 
could  help  to boost  the  competitiveness of  Europe's  Industry  against  Its 
major  lnternat!o•lal  competitors. 11.-
4.3  Standardization and  Certification 
4.3.  1 
4.3.2 
Technical  barriers  due  to  differences  In  regulations  and  standards  between 
~ember States,  and  the  retention  of  specific  national  procedures  for 
certification,  are  handicaps  not  suffered  by  the American  Industry. 
StandardIzatIon 
The  European  Association of  Aerospace  Manufacturers  (AEC~A)  has  signed  a 
memorandum  of  understanding  with  the  CEN,  the  European  Committee  for 
Standardization,  recognizing  the  former  as  the  associate  body 
responsible  for  the  technical  aspects  of  standards  relating  to  the 
aerospace  Industry.  The  memorandum  of  understanding  entered  Into  force 
on  1  January  1987  and  Is  yielding good  results. 
certification 
The  national  clvl I  aviation  authorities  are  responsible  for  the 
certification  procedure  leading  to  the  Issue  of  certificates  of  air 
worthiness. 
Harmonization  of  the  certification  requirements  for  aerospace  products 
should  provide  the  optimum  level  of  safety  whl  le  considerably  reducing 
the  cost  of  certification  and  so  promoting  the  free  movement  of 
aerospace  products within  the  Community. 
The  national  civil  aviation  authorities  have  set  up  the  JAA  (Joint 
Aviation  Authorities)  with  the  tasK  of  developing  a  common  approach  to 
safety.  The  Commission  wishes  to  strengthen  the  work  of  the  JAA  by 
encouraging  the  establishment  of  a  European  civil  aviation  authority 
with  legal  terms  of  reference.  Discussions  on  the  subject  are  now  In 
progress. 
4.4  European  export  credit  Insurance  system 
As  production  common  to  a  number  of  Member  States  develops,  the  need  for  a 
Community  mechanism  to  provide  cover  for  exports  becomes  Increasingly 
apparent.  At  present  the  ~ember States'  credit  Insurance  agencies  are  not 
able  to  cover  such  operations  effectively;  a  single  contract  for  exports 
from  a  numbAr  of  ~ember States  often  requires  separate  approaches  to  each 
national  credit  Insurance  agency.  As  a  result,  the  companies  often  only 
approach  their  usual  lenders,  to  the  detriment  of  their  competitiveness. 1-;;l.-
4.5.  Trans-European  Networks 
In  accordance  with  the  European  Councils  of  Strasbourg  and  Dublin  and  with 
the  Councl I  Resolution  of  22  January  1990  on  the  Trans-European  Networks, 
the  concertatlon  between  the  Community  and  the  Member  States  should  be 
Intensified  In  order  to  Improve  the  adaptation  of  existing  and  future 
Infrastructures  to  the  forecast  for  the  development  of  air  transport.  The 
two  urgent  problems  which  have  been  Identified  In  this  context,  relate  to 
the  airspace  occupation  and  the  air  traffic  control  as  well  as  the  airport 
Infrastructures. 
5.  Research  and  technological  development  policy 
5.1.  Although  the  use  of  advanced  technology  In  the  design  of  aircraft,  their 
propulsion  and  their  eQuipment  Is  not  the  sole  or  most  Important  single 
Ingredient  of  future  commercial  success,  It  Is  the  case  that  a  shortfal 1  In 
the  level  and  maturity  of  the  technology  employed  will  surely  lead  to 
convnerclal  failure.  In  contrast  to  the  situation  In  the  phases  of 
development  and  production,  cooperation  on  research  has  been  comparatively 
limited.  Whl  le  this  Independence  of  approach  In  research  has  value  and  was 
fairly  easily  sustainable  In  the  past,  when  many  government  Inputs  wNe 
substantial,  It  Is  becoming  Increasingly  unsatisfactory  for  the  future. 
The  conJunction  of  Increasing  sophistication  and  cost  of  technology  with 
diminishing  support  by  national  governments  makes  It  both  Important  and 
urgent  that  concrete  steps  should  be  taken  to  encourage,  with  respect  to 
COmmunity  competition  rules,  more  and  closer  cooperation  between  the 
numerous  operators  who  contribute  to  aeronautical  research  and  technology 
acQuisition  within  the  Community.  The  benefits  which  may  be  expected  to 
flow  from  such  growth  in  cooperation are  considerable: 
1.  maintenance of  a  state-of-the-art  technology  base; 
I 1.  more  efficient  use  of  material  and  human  resources; 
I II.  encouragement  of  yet  closer  coordination/cooperation  between 
companies  In  the  ensuing  stages of  development; 
lv.  provision of  a  mechanism  for  a  coordinated  approach  to prenormatlve 
research  Questions; 
v.  provision  of  a  common  framework  within  which  to  approach  research 
Questions  In  areas of  universal  environmental  and  social  concern. 
In  March  1989,  the  Council  adopted  the  BRITE/EURAM  Research  Progranrne 
(1989-92)  which  includes  a  2-year  exploratory  programme  of  aeronautical 
research  activity.  This  activity,  which  Is  now  In  progress,  will  be 
carefully  evaluated  before  any  decision  Is  made  on  whether  to  propose 
further  Community  action  to  prompt  research  cooperation. 13.-
5.2.  Taking  account  of  the  conseQuences  of  the  reduction  In  defense  budgets  on 
research  In  the  military  area  and  the  technology  transfer  within  dual 
undertakings,  It  could  be  useful  for  the  sector  as  a  whole,  If  the 
Community  ,  whl  le  respecting  the  principle of  subsidiarity,  were  to support 
Increased  research  In  those  areas  common  to  both  the  military  and  the 
c I vII. 
6.  Treatment  of state aids 
The  International  context  In  which  the  European  aircraft  Industry 
operates  reQuires  It  to  boost  Its  competitiveness  from  Its  own 
resources.  To  maintain  a  system  of  free,  undlstorted  competition, 
complying  with  GATT  rules,  Is  one  of  the  cornerstones  of  the  Community. 
Nevertheless,  It  must  be  recognised  that  In  the  past  International 
competition  has  been  affected  by  the  large-scale  assistance  which  t:as 
benefitted everyone  Involved  In  the  world  aeronautics  Industry.  In  tt:ls 
area,  as  has  already  been  seen  more  and  more  In  other  Industrial 
sectors,  It  Is  essential  that  In  future  there  Is  transparency  In  pubt lc 
financing.  The  aim  of  Improving  the  competitiveness  of  the  aeronautics 
Industry  lmpl les  a  progressive  reduction  In  publ lc  support  In  which  the 
timing  and  the  extent  will  depend  on  the  efforts  made  by  European 
Industry's competitors. 
7.  Conclusions 
The  majority  of  the  Industrial  or  service  sectors  are  displaying  an 
ever-Increasing  cross-frontier  Integration  of  their  management  and 
decision-making  centres,  whereas  the  European  aerospace  Industry  which, 
however,  serves  a  world-wide  market,  forms  an  exception  to  this  rule. 
Owing  to  national  strategy  and  defence  pol Icy  factors  the  split  nature 
of  production  facilities  and  companies  restricts  the  development  of 
production  activities  and  structures  to  national  territory.  This 
explains  why,  In  recent  years,  aircraft  Industry,  both  clvl I  and 
military,  has  often  achieved  maximum  Integration  within  the  confines  of 
Its national  frontiers. 
Thus,  In  that  the  size  and  Integration of  the  production  facilities  and 
their  management  may  help  greatly  In  consol ldatlng  the  competitive 
situation of  the  aerospace  companies,  Europe's  Industry  stl I I  posses5es 
In  this  area  significant  potential  for  improving  Its  competitiveness  In 
terms  of  economies  of  scale. 14.-
In  contrast  the  American  aircraft  Industry,  which  has  been  able  to  fa I 1 
back  on  a  vast  home  market,  has  developed  product I  on  and  management 
structures which  better meet  the  critical  size criterion. 
It  must  be  made  clear  that  the  choice  and  Implementation  of  synergies 
lie  solely  with  the  Industry's  managers  who,  moreover,  bear  the  risks 
associated  with  those  operations.  For  Its  part  the  Community  must 
provide  the  background  conditions  that  favour  the  development  of  an 
aerospace  Industry  that  Is  able  to ensure  Its own  financial  vlabl 1  lty  In 
the  long  term  on  an  open,  competitive  market.  A prereQuisite  for  thl~ 
Is  the  setting  up  of  a  dialogue  between  the  economic  operators. 
t.Aember  States  and  the  Commission  In  such  a  way  that,  where  needed, 
adJustments meeting  specific needs  can  be  made  at  Internal-market  level. 
This  being  the  case  the  Commission  Intends  to  examine  the  following,  In 
succession: 
the  relative  competitiveness  of  European  civil  aviation,  Including 
Its  sub-contractors,  account  being  taken,  In  particular,  of  the 
potential  for  economies  of scale  In  both  development  and  production; 
the  lndustr Ia I  measures  needed  to  achieve  those  economies  of  scale 
and  the  problem  arising  with  regard  to  protecting  the  competence  of 
the  t.Aember  States  as  regards  defence  strategy; 
the  Institutional  and  legal  conditions  to  be  provided  In  order  to 
ease  the  Industrial  Integration  and  cooperation  to  be  defined  by 
managers; 
the  problems  linked  with  the  funding  of  civil  aeronaut leal  Industry 
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Annex 1: STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD AEROSPACE  INDUSTRY 
Community aerospace production was  over ECU 
30 billion in 1988. 
The European aerospace industry enjoys practical-
ly  steady growth,  with  no  slumps  or surges  in 
turnover. 
With an aerospace turnover of more than ECU 78 
billion, however, the United States is still by far the 
world's leading producer. 
Graph  1:  World  Aerospace Industry 
Billion ECU  1985 • Constant Prices 
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Thble 1 Aerospace Thrnover 
Current Prices  Constant Prices  Growth Rate  Employment 
Billion ECU  Billion ECU 1985  Prices 1985  (000) 
EC  USA  EC  USA  EC  USA  EC 
1978  9.2  24.5  16.5  70.1  8.7%  NA 
1979  10.6  28.0  16.8  78.3  1.9%  11.6%  424 
1980  14.1  34.0  19.4  86.9  15.5%  11.0%  472 
1981  16.7  49.1  2IJ.6  89.3  5.7%  2.8%  500 
IIJH2  18.4  .'i'J.9  21.1  Hti.4  3.5'Y,;  1.1%  483 
1983  19.3  72.0  21.4  89.9  0.8%  4.0%  482 
1984  21.5  84.2  22.7  86.0  6.2%  4.4%  465 
1985  24.7  103.3  24.7  103.3  8.5%  2IJ.2%  481 
1986  27.5  86.5  27.3  108.7  10.3%  5.2%  488 
1987  29.3  77.7  28.8  114.8  5.7%  5.6%  492 
1988  31.6  77.9  29.3  114.0  1.6%  0.7%  502 
1978-88  5.9%  5.0% 
EC • DG III I Source: Industrial Associations 
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Annex 2  LEADING WORLD AEROSPACE  COMPANIES 
Aerospace production on a world scale is concen-
trated  among  a  small  number  of  large 
manufacturers. 
There is still a very big difference in  size between 
major  US  and  European companies.  The three 
main  European manufacturers, British  Aerospace, 
Aerospatiale and MBB have on average one-quarter 
of the  turnover of their  US  competitors Boeing, 
McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed. 
In terms of prime contractorship (or programme 
leadership)  the  US  major  companies' specializa-
tions are fairly clear: 
•  civil  and  military transport  aircraft: Boeing, 
McDonnell Douglas,  Lockheed; 
'Thble 2 Thmover of Major Aerospace Manufacturers 
Billion ECU  1982  1983  1984 
M.B.B.  2.4  2.6  2.6 
Aerospatiale  3.3  3.5  3.7 
British Aerospace  3.7  3.9  4.2 
Boeing  9.2  12.5  13.1 
Me Donnell Douglas  7.1  8.6  11.3 
Lockheed  5.7  7.3  10.3 
Dassault  2.0  2.1  2.3 
Casa  .3  .3  .3 
Aeritalia  .6  .6  .8 
Dornier  .5  .4  .4 
Fokker  .5  .6  .6 
Shorts  .3  .3 
Matra  .8  .8  .8 
General Dynamics 
Grumman  2.1  2.5  3.3 
Northrop  2.5  3.7  4.7 
Rockwell  2.9  4.3  5.5 
Rolls-Royce  2.7  2.3  2.4 
General Electric  3.0 
Pratt & Whitney  5.3  5.1  5.4 
Snecma  .9  1.0  1.2 
M.T.U.  .4  .4  .5 
Fiat Aero  .2  .3  .3 
EC - DG III 1  Source: Industrial Associations 
•  strategic bombers: Boeing, Rockwell,  Northrop; 
•  fighters  and  attack  aircraft:  McDnll"!c!' 
Douglas,  Northrop,  General Dynam:cs, 
Gntmman; 
•  engines: General Electric,  United Techno/ogv. 
As in the United States, large European aerosr·1ce 
companies  operate  in  both  the  military  and  civil 
fields. 
What is more, the process of concentrating nati,mal 
aerospace capabilities is  not yet  complete. Unlike 
British Aerospace and MBB, which  have  a hand in 
both  European collaborative  combat aircraft  pro-
grammes  and  the  Airbus  programme,  both  with 
1985  1986  1987  1988  J 189 
2.7  2.6  2.9  3.4  3.9 
3.6  3.7  3.5  4.0  4.4 
4.5  4.7  5.8  6.1 
17.9  16.6  13.4  14.4  :0.4 
13.8  11.8  10.5  11.3 
12.5  10.5  9.8  9.0 
2.4  2.3  2.2  2.5  3.3 
.4  .3  .4  .6  .7 
.8  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.6 
.6  .5  .5  .8 
.5  .6  .5  .9 
.3  .3  .3 
.8  .8  .9  1.0 
4.0  4.4  4.6  45 
3.5  2.9  2.2  2.2 
6.6  5.7  5.3  4.9 
7.0  5.6  4.4  3.4 
2.7  2.7  2.9  3.0 
5.9  5.1  5.0  5.0 
5.3  5.5  5.7  6.3 
1.4  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.9 
.5  .5  .6  .7 
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Thble 2  (continued) Workforce of Major Aerospace Manufacturers 
('000)  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989 
M.B.B.  38.5  36.8  35.5  36.9  37.6  38.5  39.9  42.8 
Aerospatiale  36.5  35.5  35.5 
British Aerospace  79.0  78.0  76.0 
Boeing  95.7  84.6  86.6 
McDonnell Douglas  61.0  62.8  72.7 
Lockheed  70.2  71.8  81.3 
Dassault  15.8  15.8  16.2 
Casa  9.6  9.8  10.0 
Aeritalia  12.3  12.3  12.3 
Dornicr  6.9  6.7  6.8 
Fokker  9.6  8.4  9.1 
Shorts  6.3  6.2 
Matra  3.7  4.4  4.8 
Grumman  27.3  28.8  30.5 
Northrop  35.5  37.2  41.5 
Rockwdl  21J.O  42.3  413 
Rolls-Royce  4X.H  423  40.  ') 
Pratt &  Whitney  43.9  40.7  42.1 
Snecma  12.6  13.0  13.4 
M.T.U.  6.2  6.2  6.3 
Fiat Ano  3.6  3.5  35 
EC - DG III I Source: Industrial Associations 
34.9  34.2  32.8  32.6  32.7 
75.6  75.5  86.8  84.9 
98.7  IIR.5  126.0  126.0 
83.3  92.3  99.3  109.4 
87.8  96.9  97.3  86.0 
16.1  15.8  14.7  13.8  13.0 
10.2  10.6  10.5  10.4  10.6 
12.6  12.9  13.7  14.2 
6.9  7.5  7.4  9.2 
10.1  10.9  11.7  11.6 
6.6  7.2  7.2 
4.8  4.9  5.0  4.7 
32.0  35.0  32.0  32.0 
46.9  46.0  46.0 
45.7  41.1  34.4  32.11 
41.7  41.')  42.0  40.1) 
43.9  46.7  46.5  46.0 
13.9  13.9  13.4  13.5  13.9 
6.6  7.0  7.4  7.8 
3.6  4.5  4.7  4.H  4.X 
Among aero-engine makers, the relative positions 
of US and European programme leaders are dif-
ferent from  those in  the aircraft field. There is  no 
growing  European  and  export  sales, Aerospatia/e 
and Dassau/t are both more specialized in their ac-
tivities. Aerospatiale,  unlike  its  partners British 
Aerospace and MBB, is  not involved in the big Eu-
ropean  cooperative combat  aircraft  programmes. 
Dassault,  which  concentrates on  national  combat 
aircraft programmes, is also the only big European 
aerospace manufacturer with no stake in  the high-
growth market for  commercia] transport aircraft. 
1  uniformity in the position of aero-engine makers in 
Europe. In  addition, European cooperative struc-
tures are not a  dominating factor in  the activities 
of the companies concerned. 
Acn·tuliu's and CASA's activities arc chieny linked 
with the development of cooperative projects. The 
small  traditional  manufacturers, Domier (taken 
over by Daimler-Benz in  1985), Fokker,  Shons (ta-
ken  over by Bombardier in  1989)  concentrate to a 
greater extent on their own projects and enjoy lo-
wer growth owing to the difficulty they experience 
in fmding follow-on projects for their present pro-
grammes. After a period of strong growth Matra  is  · 
keeping up a steady level of activity based on spe-
cialization in missiles. 
Up to the early 1980s Rolls-Royce's had a turnover 
in  the same order of magnitude as the  US  No 2 
General Electric. But international ranking changed 
radically in  the  19HOs,  with spectacular growth by 
General  Elccm·c,  which  became  No  1,  coinciding 
with  a  sharp fall  by Pratt  &  Whitney,  white Rolls-
Royce  stood still.  At  the  same ti:nc  SNECMA,  a 
close associate of General Electric in the civil field, 
enjoyed strong growth. 
Most of the  civil-engine  activity of the European 
leader Rolls-Royce  is  taken up with in-house  pro-
grammes.  In  the  military  engine  field,  however, Towards A Competitive European Aircraft Industry 
European cooperation is  the  dominant factor  un-
der the joint company Turbo-Union  (suppiying the 
engines for  Tomado  and EFA). 
Europe's No 2 aero-engim: maker, Sl.:ECM.A, Joc:. 
almost all of its civil work in cooperation with Ge-
neral Electric,  the  US  leader, and  the  bulk  of its 
• military work  under purely national  programmes. 
• 5 • 
The other two  European  aero-engine  manufadu-
rcrs MTU and Ftat Al'tazmre, arc both <.hvis10n.,  oi 
strong engine  companies, and have  boosted  their 
activities through participation in  European wore-
rativ~  milit~:-y  programme~ 
cooperative civil  programmes. Towards  A C'ompt'fitive European .AJrcrart  lndustr:  • 6 • 
Annex  3 THE STRUCTURE OF  EUROPEAN AEROSPACE  PRODUCTION 
The consolidated turnover of the European aeros-
pace industry  was  over  ECU 30  billion  in  1988: 
about 3% of industrial production. 
The number of jobs in  aerospace  was  steady in 
1988: approximately 500,000 employees or just over 
1% of employment in industry. 
Exports of aerospace equipment in  1988  were al-
most  ECU 15  billion,  nearly half of turnover. 
Trade  in  military equipment  has  been  in  balance 
since the beginning of the  1970s, but trade in  civil 
equipment is  a different matter and did not move 
into surplus until the mid-1980s. 
Graph  2:  EC  Aerospace Industry 
Billion ECU  '000 
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Thble 3 EC Aerospace Industry 
Billion  TOTAL  CIVIL 
ECUs  TUrnover  Exports  Employment  Turnover  Exports  Imports  Balance 
1978  9.2  3.8  NA  2.6  NA  NA  NA 
1979  10.6  4.1  423.6  3.0  NA  NA  HA 
1980  14.1  5.7  471.7  4.0  NA  NA  · NA 
1981  16.7  1U  500.2  4.9  2.8  4.3  -l.5 
1982  18.4  9.0  483.2  5.0  4.1  3.6  :).6 
1983  19.3  9.3  483.1  5.9  4.5  4.0  0.5 
1984  21.5  10.1  464.8  6.6  6.3  4.9  1.3 
1985  24.7  11.6  481.1  7.6  6.9  6.1  0.8 
1986  27.5  13.0  488.4  10.0  6.2  6.2  0.0 
1987  29.3  12.9  491.6  9.9  6.0  6.0  0.0 
1988  31.6  15.0  502.4  10.9  10.8  10.2  0.5 
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Breakdown by country 
Aerospace production in the Community is  largely 
1  The  Netherlands,  Belgium,  and  Spain  (whose  in-
accounted for by four countries: the United King- dustry  is  of more  recent  date)  each account for 
dom, France, Germany and Italy.  about 1% of EC output. 
Graph  3:  EC  Aerospace Production (1988) 
Nl 
Es 
8 
Thble 4.  Breakdown of EC Aerospace Thmover according to Country (EC = 100) 
BE  DE  ES  FR  IT  NL 
1978  1  15  1  40  6  2 
1979  2  20  1  38  7  2 
1980  2  17  1  36  6  2 
1981  2  16  1  35  7  2 
1982  2  18  2  35  8  2 
1983  1  18  1  36  9  2 
1984  1  17  1  36  9  2 
1985  1  18  1  35  9  2 
1986  1  25  1  33  9  2 
1987  1  24  1  31  9  1 
1988  1  25  2  31  9  2 
EC - DG III I Source: Industrial Associations 
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Breakdown by type of product 
As  regards technical segmentation by  type  of pro-
duct,  European  production  is  still  mainly 
accounted  for  by  airframes.  The  product  break-
down  is  changing,  however,  with  the  following 
trends apparent: 
•  a decline in the share of airframes and engines; 
•  a rise  in the share of equipments, chiefly due 
to the growing importance of avionics (airbor-
ne electronics); 
• !!  . 
•  the emergence of production of space hardwa-
re, chiefly related to the Ariane launch vehicle 
and applications satellites. 
The purely "space" production of the European ae-
rospace  industry still  accounts  for  only a  small 
fraction  of total  output,  though  growing  rapidly: 
5% in  1988  compared with 3% in  1980.  Note that 
the space industry in  Europe has no separate iden-
Graph  4:  EC  Aerospace  Production 
As% ot  total 
~  Equlpme'lt 
0  Engines 
•  Space 
~  Aircraft & Missiles 
Thble S Breakdown of EC Aerospace Thrnover according to Sub-sector (as % of Total) 
Aircraft &  Missiles  Space  Engines  Equipment 
1978  54.9  2.8  20.9  21.5 
1979  56.8  2.8  19.9  20.5 
1980  54.1  3.2  19.6  23.1 
1981  53.5  3.0  19.8  23.7 
1982  54.1  3.7  19.9  22.3 
1983  54.0  3.8  17.4  24.9 
1984  52.9  4.0  17.9  25.2 
1985  51.3  5.4  18.8  24.5 
1986  46.8  5.5  18.0  29.7 
1987  48.8  4.7  17.3  29.3 
1988  51.3  5.2  16.2  273 
EC . DG III I Source: Industrial Associations Towards A Competitive European Aircraft Industry  - 9 -
Graph 5:  EC  Aerospace Production 
As 
%of 
tity, in that the bulk of the work is done by compa-
nies in the aircraft field. 
Space activity is divided between the Space Agen-
cies'  markets and  the commercial  market.  The 
latter relates to the manufacture of application sa-
tellites and - chietly - of the Ariane launch vehicle. 
Work  under national  space  agency  programmes 
and the European Space Agency's programmes co-
vers scientific and experimental projects, the future 
Ariane 5 launch vehicle,  the Columbus  space sta-
tion and the Hennes spaceplane. 
The major part of European aerospace production 
is stiU accounted for by military equipment - chietly 
combat aircraft,  trainers,  military  helicopters and 
missiles of aU classes. 
Despite little growth in  military procurement bud-
gets, military aircraft output has  nevertheless 
grown at  a  higher rate because the  European in-
dustry has gradually won  back its  own  military 
market and boosted its exports. 
European civil aircraft production has been much 
less seriously affected than its American counter-
part by cyclical demand fluctuations, either upward 
or downward. 
Space production is much lower than in the United 
States, with  5%  of total  aerospace  production in 
1988 as compared with 20% in the US, but has en-
joyed rapid and steady growth,  chiefly  fuelled  by 
public spending, especially European Space Agen-
cy expenditure. 
The pattern of European production is  changing, 
with civil  work accounting for  an  increasing frac-
tion, having increased from 30% of total output in 
1980  to almost 35% in  1988.  This is  due to civil 
output growing at a more sustained rate and should 
continue at least into the early 1990s  for two rea-
Military 
sons:  a  marked slow-down  in  the  military sphere, 
in  both  home and export  markets,  and continued 
expansion in  airliner production with  rising output 
of the A320, A330 and A340. European production 
of small commercial transport aircraft should conti-
nue to  grow at the same time. 
Military Output 
Up to  1982  military  output was  the driving  fo1 ce 
behind the European aerospace industry's gro\\ th. 
Since then a slow-down has occurred, due toE< st-
West  detente and to a decline in  export markets, 
particularly in  the Middle East,  and to the  trans-
ition between two generations of aircraft, i.e. from 
Tornado, Mirage  and Harrier to the EFA  and Rafale 
programmes now under development. The same is 
happening with  missiles and hc..:licoptcrs,  with  out-
put levelling off before the  upturn which  is  likely 
to follow  the introduction of a  new generation of 
systems. 
Civil production 
Civil aerospace production, however, is riding high; 
strong market growth  coincides with  a lime  when 
the European industry can supply a  full  range  of 
civil aircraft, from  small transport aircraft with  fe-
wer  than  20  seats  to  long-haul  wide-bodied jets. 
However, it  is  handicapped by a  time-lag in  brin-
ging  its  production  facilities  into line;  these  are 
expanding rapidly and in  the commercial field  the 
European industry is at present experiencing a ge- -
nuine change in  its  scale of production. The 
European industry supplied just a  few  percent of 
the world market 15 years ago; it has  now succee-
ded in capturing a quarter of it. 
The rise in production of the Airbus range involves 
most large European aerospace companies, in par-Towards A Competitive European Aircraft Industry  • 10 • 
Graph  6:  EC  Civil Aircraft Production 
ticular Aerospatiale,  MBB,  Domier,  British  Aeros-
pace, CASA, Fokker and Sonaca. 
Apart from Airbus, output of European commer-
cial jets also includes the BAel46 and Fokker 100; 
the market for  these is  also growing strongly. 
The European industry - particularly in  Italy and 
Spain - also shares in the growth of output of Ame-
rican civil  aircraft  produced by Boeing  and 
McDonnell Douglas. 
Civil aircraft production also includes the manufac-
ture  of small  turboprop transport aircraft  for 
regional routes  (known  as  commuter  aircraft  or 
feeder-liners). 
Helicopters 
The  European helicopter  industry  is  made  up  of 
Aerospatiale, MBB, Westland and Agusta. 
After growing almost continually up to 1982 the he-
licopter  market  experienced a  recession  from 
Helicopters  5% · 
General Aviation  14%  · 
which  it  is  only now beginning to emerge; this ap-
plies  to both the  military  and civil  helicopter 
markets.  The  outlook  is  now  better;  the  market, 
particularly for  exports, is  recovering. 
Engines 
Since 1980 the European aero-engine industry has 
seen steady growth, like  the airframe industry but 
with  an  even  more  marked shift  of emphasis  to-
wards the civil field. 
Civil engine production is underpined by the strong 
growth in the civil aircraft market but is not directly 
linked  with  production of European civil  aircraft, 
which are chiefly powered by American engines. 
This is  likely to change, however,  as output of the 
A320 builds  up  and with  Rolls-Royce  engines po-
wering the new A330. The large orders secured for 
powering  both American  and  European aircraft 
and the good prospects for  this market will  result 
in steady growth in future years. Towards A Competitive European Aircraft Industry  • 11  • 
Annex 4 PRODUCTIVITY IN  THE EUROPEAN  AEROSPACE  INDUSTRY 
The European aerospace industry's lower level  of 
wage costs than the American industry's is a major 
advantage  for  the former  but  is  not  enough,  to 
compensate for the major disadvantages of scale of 
production discussed earlier. 
. 
Ultimately, the process of concentrating European 
aircraft  production into a smaller number of pro-
grammes,  with  longer  production  runs,  should 
enable the European industry to exploit its we:ge-
cost advantage, which so far,  has  not been eno 1gb 
to  compensate  for  its  lower  apparent productivity 
Labour productivity in  the European aerospace is 
much  lower than in  the American industry owing 
'  of labour. 
to the fact  that production is  still  on a small  scale 
1 
and production  runs much shorter, which  reduces 
the  learning curve  effect.  This means more  work 
for  the same output. 
With  production runs for some typt:s of equipm :nt, 
such  as  helicopters,  certain  tactical  missi:cs, 
commuter aircraft and satellite launch vehicles, al-
ready similar  to  those  achieved  by  the Ameri;:an 
aerospace industry, labour productivity is even now 
higher than in  the United States. 
Table 6 Productivity of Major Aerospace Manufacturers 
in  '000 ECUs  1983  1984  1985  1986  :987 
Value  Added by  Worker 
M.B.B.  33  36  34  34  36 
Aerospatiale  51  36  37 
British Aerospace  20  23  25  24  23 
Boeing  49  58  62  50  40 
McDonnell Douglas  43  51  56  45  39 
Lockheed  47  55  59  48  43 
Employment Costs by Worker 
M.B.B.  26  28  29  32  34 
Aerospatiale  32  34  36 
British Aerospace  17  19  20  19  19 
Boeing  38  44  46  38  32 
McDonnell Douglas  33  38  41  34  30 
Lockheed  37  43  45  37  32 
Productivity  Margin (Value Added/Employment Costs ) 
M.B.B.  1.26  1.28  1.18  1.08  1.05 
Acrospatialc  1.56  1.05  1.02 
British Aerospace  1.15  1.20  1.20  1.24  1.23 
Boeing  1.30  1.31  1.36  1.34  1.23"' 
McDonnell Douglas  1.31  1.34  135  1.30  ·,.28 
Lockheed  1.27  1.29  131  1.30  1.32 
EC- DG III I Source: EUROSTAF Towards A Competitive European Aircraft Industry  • 12  • 
Thble 7 Value Added by Worker in the Aerospace Industry 
in '000 ECUs  1983  1984  1985  1986  . 987 
FRG  30  34  33  35 
France  36  45  46  44 
Italy  27  29  31  34  33 
UK  24  24  25  29 
USA (•)  46  55  59  47  40 
EC- DG III I Source: EUROSTAF- (•) average for  Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed 
Effect of exchange rates on wage costs 
Owing to their magnitude variations in rates of ex-
change are quite clearly  a  basic  factor  affecting 
movements in the relative levels of labour produc-
tivity in Europe and the United States. 
This is  a considerable drawback for  the European 
industry,  because commercial  aircraft  have  for  a 
long time  been priced in  dollars.  Both its  income 
and its costs, in relative terms, fluctuate to an ex-
tent  that  is  often beyond  conventional  means of 
obtaining forward  cover owing to the amounts in-
volved  and  the  uncertainties  due  to market 
fluctuation. Towards A Competitive European Aircraft Industry  . 13. 
Annex 5 GROWTH OF EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION 
The European aerospace industry has  been inte-
grating its civil and military programmes for about 
twenty years. 
On the military side,  chiefly bilateral cooperative 
programmes  are  progressively  being  extended  to 
take in multilateral arrangements. 
Overall,  the  trend  towards  European production 
integration is growing steadily, though with impor-
tant specific national features, in particular: 
•  the continued existence in Europe of program-
mes which compete head on; 
•  multilateral  cooperative structures  in  w~ich 
one major partner docs not participate; 
•  transatlantic  cooperative  arrangements which 
are in a dominant position in  relation to Euro-
pean  programmes  - especially in the  engine 
field. 
Graph 7:  lntra-EC Aerospace Co-operation 
AS  '!1.  of Turnover 
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Thble 8 Indicator of the level of intra-european co-operation in aerospace sector 
Sales to other EC aerospace manufacturers (as % of turnover) 
BE  DE  ES  FR  IT  NL  UK  EC 
.  -------·-- .  ------ -· ---· --------- ·-· ---· -- -
J97X  .w  25  H!  7  u  12  16  14 
1979  26  20  25  8  9  11  18  14 
1980  17  30  26  8  22  12  15  15 
1981  18  36  28  8  13  15  21  18 
1982  17  38  20  7  11  16  24  19 
1983  20  39  29  9  20  13  25  21 
1984  28  39  18  8  21  10  23  20 
1985  28  34  17  4  25  5  19  17 
1986  32  24  15  5  26  5  19  16 
1987  33  22  13  6  26  3  14  15 
1988  24  25  16  6  26  4  16  16 
EC - DG III I Source: Industrial Associations Towards A Competitive European Aircran Industry  •  :4 • 
Annex  6:  RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT 
Technological development is very important in the 
aerospace  industry:  R&D accounts  for  over  15% 
of turnover. Consequently, the aerospace industry's 
importance in terms of R&D activity far outweighs 
its  share of production. The European aerospace 
industry comes  third,  after  electrical  engineering 
and electronics and  the chemical  industry,  with 
13.8% of total industrial R&D expenditure. 
Because  output is  smaUer,  aerospace R&D has a 
greater apparent magnitude in  Europe than in  the 
United States. This is  due to the large number of 
military and civil  programmes with  production on 
a smaller scale than in  the United States.  In view 
of the  high  costs  of development  in  the  industry, 
the relative share of industrial R&D in  Europe ap-
pears disproportionately large  in  relation  to 
production. This is even more pronounced in terms 
of public R&D investment. 
Aerospace is the only industry where the State pro-
vides  more  than 50%  of R&D  expenditure.  The 
trend  now,  however,  is  towards a  fall  in  the  pro-
portion  of public support  fur  aerospa~.:e R&D  in 
Europe at  the  same  time  as  production  is  rising; 
the share of public finance fell  from 75  to 58% be-
tween  1975  and 1985. 
Military aerospace  is  the  biggest  consumer of 
R&D. Military R&D is partly concerned with fields 
specific to military applications, but most basic re-
search is  dual-purpose, i.e.  military and civil. This 
explains the importance of military hardware pro-
duction as  a form of support for  innovation in  the 
civil  field. 
Many technologies originate in  aerospace and dif-
fuse  into other  industries. That the aerospce 
industry's role as a  te~.:hnology driver is  recogni 'Cd 
is shown  by the increasing number of technical co-
operation  agreements  between  aerosp tce 
companies and businesses in  other industries,  the 
engine  industry  in  particular. Conversely,  proc uc-
tion technologies arc transferred, particularly r, om 
the engine industry,  to aerospace. 
Graph  8:  Public Support to  the  Aerospace  Industry 
Billion  ECU 
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Thble 9 Breakdown or Public Support to the Aerospace Industry according to contract type 
Billion ECU  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 
EC  _ 
R&D  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.5  2.9  3.1  3.5  4.1  3.6 
-civil  .2  .3  .3  .3  .3  .4  .5  .7  1.3  0.7 
- military  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8  2.2  2.5  2.5  2.8  2.8  2.9 
Sales &  Maintenance  3.8  5.2  5.3  5.8  6.2  6.8  7.9  8.8  9.9  10.4 
Total  5.6  7.2  7.3  8.0  8.7  9.7  11.0  12.4  14.1  i4.0 
As %  of Thrnover  44%  42%  34%  33%  34%  35%  36%  37%  40%  36% 
USA 
----
R&D  4.3  4.8  7.6  10.3  12.5  17.1  20.5  14.5  15.4  16.2 
Sales & Maintenance  12.4  15.2  21.9  31.1  38.8  45.9  55.8  49.4  42.7  40.2 
Total  16.6  20.0  29.6  41.4  51.3  62.9  76.3  63.9  58.1  56.5 
As % of Thrnover  59%  59%  60%  69%  71%  75%  74%  74%  75%  73% 
EC - DG III I Source: Industrial Associations 
Thble 10 Public Financing or R&D 
As % of Thrnover  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1')88 
EC  12  10  8  8  8  9  9  9  10  8 
USA  15  14  16  17  17  20  20  17  20  21 
As % or Total Public Support 
EC  33  28  28  27  29  30  28  29  29  26 
- civil  3  5  4  4  4  4  5  6  9  5 
- military  30  24  24  23  25  26  23  23  20  20 
USA  26  24  26  25  24  27  27  23  27  29 
EC - DG Ill I Source: Industrial Associations Towards A Competitive European Aircraft Industry  • 16 • 
Annex 7:  DEVELOPMENT OF  THE  COMMERCIAL AIR  TRANSPORT MARKET 
An analysis of the development of this market over 
the last 20 years shows up both how large this in-
dustry has become and how irregular its growth has 
been. 
Developments in the commercial transport aircraft 
market are chiefly determined by the growth in air 
traffic, which has been practically continuous in the 
last 30 years. In the last 15 years world growth has 
averaged over 7%. Forecasts of growth in the next 
15 years vary from 3.5% to 5.5%. 
There arc, nevertheless, very marked cyclical varia-
tions  in  sales  of commercial  aircraft. These 
variations, in volume and value terms, are substan-
tial  for  an  industry of this  size,  in  which  the 
production process is particularly cumbersome and 
complex.  They form  by  far  the chief problem in 
entering and staying in  this line of activity. 
This cyclical  phenomenon is  not  confined to the 
aerospace industry but  typical  of mature  capital 
· goods industries. 
Graph 9:  World  Scheduled Air Traffic 
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Thble 11 World Scheduled Air Traffic 
PASSENGERS  FREIGHT 
Passengers  Passengers/Km  Load Factor  Tonnes 
(Billions)  (Billion)  (Mio) 
1975  0.5  697  59%  8.7 
1980  0.7  1,089  63%  11.1 
1981  0.8  1,119  64%  10.9 
1982  0.8  1,142  64%  11.6 
1983  0.8  1,190  64%  12.3 
1984  0.8  1,278  65%  13.4 
1985  0.9  1,367  66%  13.7 
1986  1.0  1,452  65%  14.7 
1987  1.0  1,589  67%  16.1 
1988  1.1  1.704  67%  17.3 
1989  1.1  1.797  68%  18.1 
EC- DG III I Source: ICAO 
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61.9 Towards A Competitive European Aircraft Industry 
Most of the factors apart from growth in air traffic 
which  affect  developments on  the  commercial jet 
transport market combine to keep it highly cyclical. 
They arise from: 
•  the airlines' attempts to anticipate events, and 
the effects of airline competition; 
•  aircraft replacement due to aging, or obsoles-
•  cence on economic and  regulatory grounds; 
and 
•  financial  constraints due to the airlines' finan-
cial health. 
The cyclical  nature of the market should be alle-
viated  by the  rising  importance  of such  "new" 
markets as those in Asia, where there is still plenty 
• 17 • 
of room  for  growth and requirements are expan-
ding on  a more linear trend. 
The most probable market outlook for the next ten 
years sees strong growth over the next three ye.trs, 
with deliveries rising to almost (82) $20 billion  per 
year,  followed  by  a  decline  to  less  than (82)  )20 
billion and with a rc.:covery at the end of the period. 
The 1989  level of net  firm  orders was  an all-time 
high.  Beyond  that  some decline is  likely,  most  of 
the big airlines will  by then have entered into long-
term commitments. 
Underlying  the cyclical  variations,  however,  Is  a 
strong growth trend  (in  volume and  in  value 
tenns), renectlng the expansion of air transport. 
Graph  10:  World  Civil Aircraft Market 
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Growing importance of export markets 
External trade in civil  aircraft has shown  conti-
nued growth, with export s  accounting for  an 
increasing share or the OUtput or the major COUD• 
tries active  in this  field.  At European level,  the 
share  of civil  output exported rose  from  26%  in 
1976 to 44% in  1985.  This trend should continue 
as part of a growing commercial breakthrough by 
the European aircraft industry into extra-Commu-
nity markets, especially in America. 
The past 15 years have seen a big increase in  the 
penetration of the American market for  civil  air-
craft by the European industry.  European 
4,000 
3,000 
2,000 
1,000 
0 
penetration of the American general aviation and 
civil helicopter markets is already over 50%. Pene-
tration  of the American market  for  large 
commercial aircraft has also grown substantially: in 
value terms, from less than 1% up to 1975 to over. 
10% since  1983,  with  a peak of 25% in  1985.  Pe-
netration of this sub-market should continul·  in 
view of the increasing sale success of European tir-
craft,  and  Airbus  in  particular,  on the Ameri.;an 
market. With  "bare"  engines (i.e.  not sold as part 
of a  complete  aircraft),  the  traditional American 
surplus has also melted away owing to imports of 
European equipment. Towards A Competitive European Aircraft Industry 
Graph  11: EC  Civil Aerospace  Exports 
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The  interpenetration  of the  American and  Euro-
pean markets  is  a  phenomenon  of increasing 
importance in all product segments. This applies to 
complete aircraft; here national preferences are be-
coming less  and  less  marked. With  engines, inter-
nationalization  and  interpenetration  have  already 
reached a very high  level. 
Graph  12:  US  Share In EC  Civil Aircraft Sales 
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US  Share  in  Total  Deliveries of 
EC-built Civil  Aircraft 
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Changes in the international breakdown of markets 
The world's civil  aircraft  markets  arc  still  very 
much  concentrated on  the  large developed coun-
tries:  the  United States  and  Europe  currently 
account for almost 60% of the world fleet. 
then  recovered  from  20% of the world  markc  in 
1975  to 44% in  1988  (i.e. hy  value of deliverie~ ). 
The last  30 years have shown an  underlying trend 
for the relative significance of the North American 
market to decline,  though  this  was  halted  by  US 
deregulation in the early 1980s:  the United States 
Europe's share of world  deliveries  fell  from  2S% 
in  1975  to 24% in  1988. 
In  terms of the value of deliveries, countries other 
than the United States and Europe feU  from  44% 
of the world market in  1975  to 31% in  1988. 
Graph  13:  World  Civil Aircraft Market (1988) 
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'Ihble 12. Breakdowu of Civil Aircraft World  Deliveries (1988 • in  Billion ECUs) 
Design Origin 
Markets  EC  USA  Rest of the World  Total 
EC  1.0  2.7  0.1  3.8 
Rest of Europe  0.4  0.5  0.0  0.9 
USA  1.5  6.8  0.2  8.5 
Rest of the World  1.2  4.6  0.2  6.0 
Total  4.1  14.6  0.5  19.2 
EC- DG Ill I Source: AEROSPATIALE 
Importance and limits of the role of home markets 
This international redistribution  has major conse-
quences for  national industries'  potential basic 
markets and for the average production runs which 
those markets reflect. 
Their huge home market was always regarded as a 
decisive  advantage  for  American manufacturers, 
enabling them to develop  mass  production for 
home  needs and to export aircraft which  enjoyed 
an advantage in terms of economies of scale of pro-
duction.  This  advantage  is  maintained  with  the 
recovery in  the American market's share of the 
world market. 
The relative size of the European market increased 
when supply was  combined under the  permanent 
structure of  Airbus lndustrie: the home market went 
from 4-5% of the world market for the British  md 
French industries to a theoretical 25% for Airl us. 
The size  of production runs  needed for  J'ro-
grammes  to  break even means  that  Europ.:an 
market  requirements cannot be  taken as the  c•nly 
criterion in defming a new aircraft: this must take 
the entire world market into account. 
The European market is still smaller than the Ame-
rican market;  most  importantly,  it  is  bss 
homogeneous  in  terms  of fleet  make-up  and  re· 
placement dates.  In  the future,  integration of the 
European market  and  more  liberalization  of air 
transport wiU  tend to produce greater homogenei-
ty,  but with the corollary of less airline stabilit)'. 
3 Towards A Competitive European AJrcraft Industry 
Annex 8:  DIRECT OPERATING COSTS 
There is no single criterion determining the compe-
titiveness of an  aircraft,  but  it  is  generally 
CJcknowlcd!!cd  that  the  decisive  factor  in  the 
competitiveness of a civil  aircraft is  its direct ope-
rating costs (DOC). 
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The main  elements in  the  DOC of a civil  aircraft 
of A320 type are as  follows:  purchase price (twO-
fifths),  fuel  (one-fifth),  crc\',ing  costs  (one-fifth), 
maintenance  (one-tenth)  and  miscellaneous fees 
and charges (one-tenth). 
Graph  15:  Civil Transport Aircraft DOC 
Landing & Navigation  10% 
Fuel 
Of the main components of DOC, aircraft price is 
the one through which the manufacturer can sub-
stantially reduce DOC: 
•  now that two-pilot  crews  have  become  the 
norm,  savings  on "crewing  costs"  are outside 
the manufacturer's control; 
•  owing to past  progress and  the present  oil 
price,  fuel  consumption,  often stressed  as a 
way  of warranting new technology develop-
Price  39% 
ments, is now equivalent to barely half the level 
of costs directly due to aircraft price; and 
•  aircraft  price,  therefore,  is  by  far  the  main 
element in DOC (about 40%), about half is di-
rectly  due  to  production  processes 
(amortization of non-recurring costs and 
labour costs). 
Graph  18:  Breakdown of Civil Aircraft Costs 
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costs  21% FINANCIAL  IMPACT 
By  Its  very  nature,  this  communication  has  no  financial  Impact.  Where 
necessary,  such  Impact  will  be  given  In  detail  when  the  Commission  makes 
specific proposals for  the  Implementation of  the proposed action. IMPACT  ON  SMALL  BUSINESS 
The  action  described  In  this  communication  wl 1  I  have  a  positive  Impact  on 
all  sectors  relating  to aviation,  and  especially  the  SUE  which  are  already 
making  sizeable contributions  to this  Industry's  hi-tech  achievements. 